Decryption requires the caller's tenant
This is a compile error on upgrade, and that is deliberate. An overload keeping the old shape would have let every existing call site keep compiling and keep reading across tenants.
What changed
| Member | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
IFieldEncryptor.DecryptAsync | (EncryptedData envelope, CancellationToken) | (EncryptedData envelope, string expectedTenantId, CancellationToken) |
SubjectFieldCryptor.DecryptFieldsAsync | (object record, CancellationToken) | (object record, string? expectedTenantId, CancellationToken) |
Why the envelope could not answer it
The read path used to take the envelope as self-describing: it names the key, so decrypt it. But the envelope is input, and on a read path it is frequently input the caller did not author — a document fetched by id, a row joined in, a projection replayed. A component that answers may I read this from a field inside the thing being read answers yes to anything shaped correctly.
So ownership now comes from outside the ciphertext: the authorized request, or trusted stored-record
metadata. Do not pass envelope.TenantId. That reinstates the defect with extra steps and the
comparison will always succeed.
What the check does
In FieldEncryptor.DecryptAsync, before any provider lookup and before the destruction ledger is
consulted:
- a blank
expectedTenantIdis refused; - a blank
envelope.TenantIdis refused; - a mismatch is refused, compared with
StringComparison.Ordinal— no trimming, no case folding.
The refusal is a CryptographicException. It is raised ahead of the ledger on purpose: were it
raised after, an erased envelope belonging to another tenant would come back as a lawful null
tombstone, and the caller would record someone else's erasure as its own.
On SubjectFieldCryptor.DecryptFieldsAsync the parameter is nullable, which is narrower than it looks:
null is tolerated only while no encrypted personal-data field is encountered. It is not a bypass —
it fails at the first field that actually needs a decision.
What you change
// Before
await cryptor.DecryptFieldsAsync(record, ct);
// After — the tenant comes from the authorized request
await cryptor.DecryptFieldsAsync(record, currentRequest.TenantId, ct);
A deployment that is not multi-tenant passes the untenanted sentinel rather than a blank, since a blank is refused:
using Excalibur.Dispatch;
await cryptor.DecryptFieldsAsync(record, KeyedTenantPartition.Untenanted.TenantId, ct);
Hosts that only register through AddCryptoShredding() and never call the cryptor or implement
IFieldEncryptor themselves have nothing to change.
Data written before 2026-10-01 will not decrypt
Envelopes carry a tenant only because the write path began stamping one in the release that fixed
cross-tenant erasure. An envelope written before that carries no TenantId, and a blank envelope
tenant is refused — so those fields now raise CryptographicException instead of returning plaintext.
This is a refusal, not data loss: the ciphertext and the key are both untouched, and the failure is
loud. But it is the one part of this change that a recompile will not surface, so before upgrading a
deployment that holds crypto-shredded data written by 10.0.0-alpha.14 or earlier, confirm whether any
stored envelope has a null or empty tenant. If it does, that data needs its envelopes re-stamped with
their owning tenant, which is a backfill against your own store — the framework cannot infer an owner
it was never told.
See also
- Crypto-shredding — the current read and write contract
- A destroyed key is stated, never inferred — the other change to this read path