Table of Contents

Enum ErasureRequestStatus

Namespace
Excalibur.Compliance
Assembly
Excalibur.Compliance.Abstractions.dll

Status of an erasure request.

public enum ErasureRequestStatus

Fields

AwaitingKeyDestruction = 8

Executed, and every remaining obligation is a key the key-management provider has irreversibly scheduled for destruction but not yet destroyed.

This is a correct intermediate state, not a failure. Everything else the erasure required has been done; what remains is the provider's own deletion window (for example AWS KMS pending deletion, or an Azure Key Vault soft-delete retention period that cannot be purged early). Until that window ends the key material is still recoverable, so the request is not Completed and no completion certificate is issued.

The request is revisitable: IErasureCompletionProcessor asks the provider whether each key is actually gone and moves the request to Completed, with its certificate, only once the provider confirms it. The provider is the authority on destruction; the scheduled instant it reported is informational and is never treated as proof. A request in this state cannot be cancelled, because the key destruction it is waiting on can no longer be withdrawn by the framework.

BlockedByLegalHold = 4

Erasure blocked by legal hold (Article 17(3)).

Cancelled = 5

Request cancelled during grace period.

Completed = 3

Erasure completed successfully.

CompletedExceptConcurrentWrites = 9

Everything the erasure was asked to do succeeded, and personal data for the same data subject was written while it was running — so the erasure did not cover that data.

This state exists because its absence forced the wrong answer. Key destruction runs once, near the start, and establishes the state of the key handles at that instant and nothing later. A write that lands afterwards, for the same subject, mints a live key at a handle the erasure had destroyed — so at the moment the certificate is signed there is personal data of an erased subject encrypted under a live key. With only Completed and PartiallyCompleted available, that outcome had to be reported as one of them: Completed attests an erasure that did not happen, and PartiallyCompleted says something failed when nothing did. A reader could not tell either apart from the genuine article.

It is not a failure, and it is not completion. Nothing the erasure attempted went wrong, and nothing needs retrying for the data it did reach — the data written during the window is simply outside what was erased. The remedy is another erasure for the same subject, once the writes have stopped; the certificate this run issues records what was reached and states that the erasure did not complete, so an auditor reads the true outcome rather than inferring one.

Confidentiality is not breached by reaching this state. Data encrypted under the destroyed key stays unreadable. What survives is data written after that destruction, which was never covered by it — a coverage gap, stated plainly, rather than an erased value becoming recoverable.

Failed = 6

Erasure failed (requires investigation).

InProgress = 2

Erasure currently executing.

PartiallyCompleted = 7

Partially completed (some data retained per exception).

Pending = 0

Request received, validation in progress.

Scheduled = 1

In grace period, awaiting execution.